We are delighted to share this video from the Antigua Experiemental Economics Workshop that was hosted for the 3rd time on February 26-28th in Antigua Guatemala at the Centro Vernon Smith de Economía Experimental at Universidad Francisco Marroquín!
Watch the video now!
You can learn more about the Antigua Workshop in Guatemala or check out all the IFREE funded workshops and conferences.
The June 2015 Vernon L. Smith High School Workshop In Experimental Economics has culminated and these students enjoyed this week-long introduction to the principles of experimental economics.
Check out the update on the fun had at this most recent IFREE-funded workshop at Chapman University!
We are excited to share the results from research funded by our IFREE Grants Program!
Incentives Against Free-riding: A Field Experiment
Paolo Nicola Barbieri, Maria Bigoni and Marco Fabbri
Read the Final Report
For more information, visit the Past Grant Recipients page.
This summer (2015) the Center for the Study of Neuroeconomics at George Mason University will host the fifth annual IFREE sponsored workshop from July 27 – July 31, from 9-4 daily at George Mason University’s Arlington Campus.
Applications are due July 15, 2015. Learn more and apply!
Proposals are due by February and August of each year, and are reviewed by the IFREE Board of Directors in April and October respectively.
Please submit your proposal to earn funding for your experimental economics research!
Discover the latest research projects that have been awarded funding by IFREE!
High school students enjoy their time during the Vernon L. Smith High School Workshop in Experimental Economics. Read more by visiting the article in Chapman University’s Happenings.
Feb. 2010
Dr. Bart Wilson of Chapman University, with Dr. Artie Zillante at UNC Charlotte, published “More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information”, as the lead article in the Review of Industrial Organization’s February issue.
Models of markets for used cars predict that sellers can pawn off lemons on trusting buyers. However, in a laboratory experiment Profs. Wilson and Zillante find stark evidence that sellers cannot pawn off lemons on buyers when transaction prices are private. Only when transaction prices are public can owners of lemons successfully masquerade as sellers of high quality goods. Artie is a former IFREE-assisted post doc at GMU.
